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THERE ARE NO NEW ISSUES RAISED ON THIS APPEAL, 
ONLY REFINED ARGUMENTS 
State Farm asserts in its Brief that Appellant has abandoned the thrust of her 
argument below. On the contrary, Appellant has merely expanded the breadth of her 
analysis of the exceptional circumstances of this case, which is of first impression in the 
Utah Court. To that end, no new arguments have been raised on this appeal. See Groberg 
v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a statement of law to the effect that ,f[a]n 
appellate court has the inherent authority to consider issues which the parties have not 
raised if doing so is necessary to a proper decision." Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. 
Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462 (Utah 1999)(citing Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash.2d 645 
782 P.2d 974 (1989). That statement of law was considered by the Utah Supreme Court 
to be applicable when "an overlooked or abandoned argument should not compel an 
erroneous result.11 The Courts in Utah "should not be forced to ignore the law just 
because the parties have not raised or pursued obvious arguments." IdL at 464. 
What remains at central issue is the language of State Farm's policy as purportedly 
limiting its liability exposure to one policy limit regardless of the number of negligent 
insureds, as is recognized by State Farm in framing its version of the issue on appeal. 
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Woven into the fabric of that complex issue are others relating to statutory compliance, 
ambiguity, and public policy considerations. 
Appellant's use of the term "omnibus" in her argument focusing on the coverage 
issue is semantical, and relates simply to the expanded coverage to "users" or "owners" of 
the subject vehicle as contemplated by, not only Section 31A-22-303, Utah Code Anno. , 
but State Farm's policy as well. Appellee mistakes the usage of technically framed 
arguments as new issues. There are no new issues raised on this appeal. 
Appellant asserted in her opening brief that the trial court erred in failing to apply 
or consider Utah's omnibus provisions in its analysis of the issues raised by State Farm in 
its motion for summary judgment. It was the trial court who indicated to the parties that 
"[tjhere's no requirement in the statute of $25,000 per injured person per insured person." 
The trial court, therefore, disagreed with Appellant's interpretation based on statutory 
grounds. [Transcript at 34-35.] That comment from the bench at oral argument on the 
parties' motions for summary judgment, raised the issue that the trial court apparently 
considered the language of the omnibus statute to divine its final ruling adverse to 
Appellant. It is only proper then to bring a more palpable analysis to the table.1 
1. What is interesting on this subject is that the Court in Murbach v. Noel 798 N.E.2d 
810 (111. App.Ct. 2003), in an abreviated ruling, also did not folly analyze the statutory import 
of its omnibus clause as applied to the challenged policy limitation. 
-2-
POINT II. 
STATE FARM CONTINUES TO FORCE ITS OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE 
POLICYfS LIMITATION ON LIABILITY PROVISION 
Simply, this case involves a question of insurance coverage for three alleged 
negligent parties insured under the same policy. Their respective acts of negligence are 
distinguishable in both time and nature. In the present case, however, the trial court 
erroneously reasoned that only one policy limit should insure all three negligent actors 
irrespective of their individual negligence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that our omnibus statute, 31A-22-
303(l)(a)(ii)(a), requires a permissive user to be insured to the same degree as the owner 
of the vehicle. Speros v. Fricke. 2004 UT 69, 1(35-36, 98 P.3d 28; Universal 
Underwriters Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.. 925 P.2d 1270, 1273. 
Unless Speros and Universal Underwriters are wrong, the negligent parties are to be 
provided separate coverage in this case. 
State Farm advances a number of specious arguments as to why Appellant cannot 
prevail. First, State Farm claims the similarities in Utah's omnibus statute compared to 
those jurisdictions that have decided this issue in their favor should control. [State Farm's 
Brief at 16.] Second, it argues that the legislature has clearly spoken on this issue and 
determined that liability insurance applies to the vehicle, regardless of the number of 
negligently insured actors. [State Farm's Brief at 22.] Third, State Farm creates a gross 
hypothetical accident scenario as an example to somehow demonstrate the unforseeability 
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of multiple claims arising if it is required to insure each potential tortfeasor for the per 
person limits of liability. [State Farm's Brief at 26.] Finally, State Farm urges the lack of 
ambiguity in the face of clear conflicting provisions in the policy that effectively render 
the limitation on liability provision ambiguous. 
First, State Farm relies upon those jurisdictions that have dealt with this issue, but 
each, admittedly, perfected an in-depth review of their respective compulsory motor 
vehicle insurance statute. State Farm fails in its approach to compare cases from other 
jurisdictions that have ruled on its side, and merely asserts similar statutory construction 
of the omnibus statutes without setting forth the statutes. Here, the lower court merely 
indicated that it had considered the language of the statute, thus bringing into issue 
whether the court failed to properly consider it.2 
A case in point is Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 492 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1993) 
cited by State Farm as "analyzing dissimilar language." State Farm's Brief at 16. The 
particular section of the Virginia Code analyzed stated, in particular: 
"A. No policy or contract of bodily injury...liability insurance, covering 
liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor 
vehicle. . .shall be issued...unless the policy contains a provision insuring 
the named insured, and any other person using or responsible for the use of 
the motor vehicle..." 
Virginia Code 38.2-2204. The General Assembly of Virginia specifically amended 
Section 38.2-2204 of the Code of Virginia in 1999 to include the following phrase: 
2. It should be pointed out that State Farm's counsel has also acknowledged what was 
assumed to be a lack of authority on this subject across the country. Counsel takes unfair 
advantage of Appellant's efforts on this appeal, yet criticizes that effort to gain favor. 
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"... nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prohibit an insurer 
from limiting its liability under any one policy for bodily injury or property 
damage resulting from any one accident or occurrence to the liability limits 
for such coverage set forth in the policy for any such accident or 
occurrence, regardless of the number of insured under the policy." Section 
38.2-2204, as amended 1999. 
What is abundantly clear, is that all "omnibus" statutes require that the policy 
insure the named owner of the policy and any other person permissively using the motor 
vehicle. While the language may be dissimilar, its import is not. Furthermore, the 
Virginia legislature apparently realized that the statute failed to account for situations 
wherein multiple insureds could be liable for damages arising out of a single accident and 
amended the omnibus statute to prohibit multiple claims. 
Conversely, Utah's omnibus statute remains silent on the subject, and this Court 
will have to read into the plain language that which Virginia expressly modified. It is 
only at State Farm's urging that the language be torqued to fit this case. State Farm did 
not provide a more thorough analysis of other omnibus clauses, since they are all the 
same except for those few that have specifically modified the structure and breadth. 
Second, State Farm argues that Section 33A-22-303 "does not connect the 
coverage it requires to the individual insured(s)...[but to] the particular insured motor 
vehicle." State Farm's Brief at 13 (Italics added). The argument is specious since an 
omnibus statute contemplates that the motor vehicle be the subject of coverage for all 
insureds named in the policy and any permissive users. That is why it is called an 
"owners" policy. That section, again, provides: 
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(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21, 
Insurance Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part 2, Liability 
Insurance in General, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage 
under Subsection 31A-22-302(1 )(a) shall: 
(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference 
all the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the 
person named in the policy, insure any other person using any 
named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the 
named insured, and, except as provided in Subsection (7), insure any 
person included in Subsection (l)(a)(iii) against loss from the 
liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within the United States 
and Canada, subject to limits...for each motor vehicle, in amounts 
not less than the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-
304; 
Section 33A-22-303, U.C.A. (Emphasis added.) 
Ms. DeHerrera agrees with State Farm that an owner's policy must identify the 
subject vehicle for which coverage will attach. The statute, however, does not create a 
limitation of coverage, but expands coverage to the owner and all permissive users 
"...against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles..." 
Therefore, under Utah's statutory scheme, all legally liable persons are covered, 
and each is cloaked with coverage "subject to" the limits for the motor vehicle under the 
policy. The legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" further contemplates separate 
coverage since ownership or use of the vehicle are distinct. In this setting, the ownership 
of the vehicle by Pacheco creates liability for his individual negligence of entrustment. 
The negligent "use" of the motor vehicle by Olmos and Martinez is concomitant to 
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ownership, and separate. The statute, therefore, guards "against loss from the liability 
imposed by law for damages" as to each person. The statute is clear in its language, and 
is only State Farm's policy that is at odds. In another sense, State Farm's limitation on 
liability clause disrobes a person who is otherwise covered by statutory mandate. 
Furthermore, the statute requires a policy to "insure any person...subject to 
limits...for each motor vehicle." The use of the terms "any person" further defeats State 
Farm's position here. State Farm is essentially urging a definition of "any person" as 
collectively meaning more than one person. The statute clearly contemplates an equation 
of where more than one person may be legally liable arising out of the use or ownership 
of a single vehicle and the policy "shall" insure any person against loss from the liability 
imposed by law for damages. 
What State Farm ignores is the issue of who is an "insured" while using that 
vehicle, and for whom it will pay legal liability damages. It is suggested, therefore, that 
State Farm's policy is at odds with the statute as to whether it will pay damages for "any 
person" who is legally liable, or just the limits applicable to the vehicle regardless of any 
legally liable insured persons. The State Farm policy purports to limit its liability based 
on the applicable automobile coverage, and not as to any legally liable person as 
mandated by Utah statutory law.3 
3 State Farm, as most other insurers brought under scrutiny, resort to the rising cost 
of insurance premiums in defense to well challenged issues. [Appellee's Brief at 27.] 
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State Farm cannot dispute that its policy defines an "insured" as "you" and "any 
other person using such a car..." See Pacheco Insurance Policy, Addendum "F" to 
Appellant's Brief. In the instant case, State Farm agreed to pay damages for which any 
insured becomes legally liable to pay, as provided in its policy: 
We will: 
1. pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay 
because of: 
a. bodily injury to others... (emphasis in original) 
It is clear, therefore, that State Farm will pay damages for an insured and any 
other person using the vehicle for which any of them become legally liable to pay. In 
this setting, coverage is applicable to all users of the vehicle, but only if they are legally 
liable for damages. State Farm then asserts that its policy effectively limits its liability 
with the following: 
The limits of liability are not increased because more than one person or 
organization may be an insured. 
In its current argument, State Farm on one hand asserts that it is unable to predict a 
risk of exposure for payment of multiple claims if the exclusion does not operate in the 
manner it suggests. On the other hand, it asserts that its policy's limitation on liability 
clearly contemplates the multiple tortfeasor-single vehicle scenario. The former plea 
indicates its disingenuous position, while the latter is contrary to Utah statutory law. 
Another dichotomy exists wherein State Farm uses the term "an insured" in the 
limitation clause to deny coverage for any and all insureds who are subject to the 
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limitation; i.e. more than one insured. Conversely, State Farm agrees to pay damages for 
any legally liable insured up to the policy limits of $50,000, yet at the same time maintain 
it is only required to pay $50,000 in total regardless of the number of negligent insureds. 
State Farm has yet to explain why it is entitled to have it both ways. This is also in stark 
contrast to the omnibus statute that mandates coverage for, not just one legally liable 
person, but separately for each. 
What is ultimately apparent is that this Court's decision will fall upon an 
interpretation of the "Limitation of Liability" provision in the subject policy. Appellant 
asserts that the limitation has nothing to do with, and never contemplated multiple 
tortfeasors in one vehicle, but its operation permits such. Only by way of hindsight does 
State Farm now realize its exposure from this rare occurrence, a prospect to which it 
agrees. 
A unadulterated interpretation of the limiting clause is to prevent stacking or 
combining of liability limits where there is more than one insured person named on the 
policy, the other which may have no legal liability. This is evident from the language 
itself, which does not differentiate between legally liable insureds or named insureds. 
State Farm drafted its policy, and must abide by it. 
If State Farm contemplated its risk of liability as to each negligent insured in a 
single vehicle, it could have easily stated such in the policy with simple language to that 
effect. Instead, State Farm stretches the construction of the present limitation language to 
mean something other than what it literally provides. That is an ambiguity. 
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Contrary to State Farm's suggestion, Ms. DeHerrera does not seek to "increase" the 
limits of liability for each insured, but only to recover what State Farm agreed to pay 
under its policy; damages from any and all insureds who are legally liable. This of course 
assumes that Ms. DeHerrera would recover damages that would amount to the policy 
limits for each of the negligent parties. The "limits of liability" have not been increased 
as to each negligent insured. State Farm further agrees that Ms. DeHerrera, if the matter 
is remanded, would have to prove her case against each defendant. 
While State Farm's exposure may be three-fold in this case, it has not stated in its 
policy that its total liability is limited to the single per-person policy limits where two or 
more insureds are legally liable to pay damages arising out of one accident. It has merely 
limited its exposure and liability to each individual insured arising out of "ownership...or 
use." 
Furthermore, State Farm urges an interpretation of the limitation that does not 
appear in the policy to the effect that the limitation applies where more than one person is 
insured under the policy, whether legally liable or not. To enforce the limitation as to 
all persons irrespective of legal liability adds meaning to the language that does not 
clearly express such terms. A more thoughtful construction of the policy's limitation on 
liability language stated above could not be more applicable to the instant case, but that is 
not what is stated. This Court should not add such. 
Only by expanding the intent of the limitation in State Farm's policy can the Court 
conclude that coverage is strictly limited by the total liability limits on the vehicle 
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irrespective of any and all other legally liable insured persons. Motor vehicles do not 
cause accidents, but insured persons. It is only fair then, subject to limits for each motor 
vehicle, that each negligent person is insured individually as "any person." 
Third, State Farm's hypothetical accident involving a 15 passenger van filled to 
capacity is nonsensical It advances such as describing the unforseeability of multiple 
claims arising out of a single motor vehicle and the likelihood of being required to pay 
out enormous amounts based on a per person limit of liability. Such hypotheticals have 
no bearing on the issue of its policy language, other than perhaps conceding that its policy 
fails in that regard. 
Finally, State Farm's ambiguity argument is self-serving. The policy speaks for 
itself, and, as indicated above, appears clear to whom State Farm will pay damages for 
legal liability. The ambiguity is created by State Farm's interpretation of its policy that is 
at odds with the legislature's mandate for whom coverage exists regardless of the number 
of legally liable persons. State Farm urges an interpretation of its own policy that does 
not appear in the governing statute or its policy. State Farm is merely trying to put a 
square peg in a round hole by modifying one or the other to make its argument fit. 
Further, State Farm conveniently ignores the parties' prior agreement that 
DeHerrera would be permitted on her appeal to challenge State Farm's policy on the basis 
of ambiguity and thereby necessarily applying the preferential rules of policy 
interpretation. See State Farm's Brief, fn 13. State Farm has reneged on the prior 
agreement whereas DeHerrera would forego seeking an excessive judgment against the 
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negligent insureds in exchange for preserving her ambiguity argument to the lower court. 
This was an essential thrust of the lower court's ruling in finding the policy's limitation on 
liability unambiguous. State Farm has waived any right to preclude a preferential 
analysis of the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court is duty-bound to analyze State Farm's policy limitation on liability with 
the plain language of the policy and governing omnibus statute. Stretching the 
interpretation will not accomplish this task. The trial court's decision should be reversed. 
Dated t h i s ^ > day of V ^ V ^ c . * \ r - v . 2006. 
ROBERfM. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
\ 
Waddoups 
for Ruby DeHerrera 
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